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Recent Cases
The staff of the Law Journal for next year is considerably in-
creased. Professor George W. Goble, who has so ably directed the
Journal for the past year, will continue as faculty adviser. Berl
Boyd, Editor-in-Chief, will be assisted by H. W. Sullivan, Business
Manager, and J. C. Farmer, Assistant Business Manager. The edi-
torial department will consist of R. T. Johnson, Chairman, and J.
B. Watkins and L. C. Fielder. The Case Comment Department under
the leadership of William Chism, Chairman, will be in charge of
Brady Stewart, Camille Davied, Guy Ledwidge, N. B. Rogers, Mrs.
J. L. Williams, Patrick Vincent, R. H. Lee, W. H. Smith, Paul
Cooper, Carl Lipe, J. L. Hayes, P. T. Oliver, Paul Ashby, and W.
K. Berryman.
Two new departments, the Current Literature Department,
which will discuss legal essays, and the News Department are added.
J. L. Williams is Chairman of the first. Camille Davied, Chairman,
Chloe Gifford, Miss Lula Northcutt and Roberta Thornton make up
the personelle of the latter.
RECENT CASES.
Descent and Distri-butian-Rigt of Widow in Royalties from
Lands Leased Before Death of Husband.
Silas McIntosh died, leaving surviving him a wife and three
infant children by a former wife. Property in question was lease
for the purpose of drilling oil wells, there being producing wells on
two of the tracts at the time of the death of the decedent. Since
dower had not been assigned the question arose as to the extent of
the widow's right of dower in the royalties accruing from such lands.
The court held (1) If oil wells or mines are opened by one
on his own land during his lifetime or are opened by his lessee after
his death under a lease given by him, the royalties contracted for by
him are profits arising from the use of the land and are a part of
the dowable real estate of the deceased husband within the meaning
of Sec. 2138, Ky. Stats., giving to the widow one-third of the rents
and profits of the husband's dowable real estate until dower is as-
signed.
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The widow is therefore entitled before the assignment of
dower, to one-third of the royalties from all the lands as against
his children, and is not confined to interest on one-third thereof.
(2) But where oil wells are drilled or mines opened by the
life tenant or by the life tenant and remainderman, or by a judgment
of a court, after the creation of the life estate, the corpus of the
royalties like the land belongs to the remainderman and the life
tenant is only entitled to the interest on the income from the royal-
ties.
Crain, Guardian v. West, Administrator, 191 Ky. 1.
Corporatioiz-Liability of Purcasing Corporation for Debts of
Selling Corporation.
The State of Kentucky recovered judgments against the Adams
Express Company. Subsequent thereto and before any attachment
of execution was levied, the Adams Express Company transferred
all of its tangible property in the State of Kentucky to the American
Railway Express Company, receiving in payment therefor stock in
the latter corporation. The transfer was in good faith, not intended
to defraud creditors, and at the instance of the Director General of
Railroads. Nothing was said about the assumption of the debts by
either party. The State of Kentucky now seeks to enforce these
judgments against the purchasing corporation.
In affirming the decision of the lower court in favor of the plain-
tiff the Court of Appeals held that where one corporation takes over
all the tangible property subject to execution of another in the state
paying therefor only by its own stock, it becomes liable to the state
creditors of the selling corporation to the extent of the value of the
property it has received in the sale, this upon the ground that such
sale is constructively fraudulent. This is so though the transfer be a
bona fide transaction and though the selling corporation retains its
corporate entity for the purpose of winding up its affairs and have,
in another state, property that might be subjected to the payment of
its debts. The court distinguishes between the power of an individual
and a corporation with respect to the disposition of all its property,
holding that the property of the latter is impressed by the law with a
trust character for the payment of its debts and where it has parted
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with such property without receiving anything in return which the
creditor can subject, the law entitles him to follow the property into
the hands of the taker to the extent of its value. The court notices
a recent decision of the North Carolina Court in a very similar case,
McAlister v. American Railway Express Company, 103 S. E. 129,
but prefers not to follow it.
American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 636.
Mines and Minerals-Renewal of Lease by Widow of Landowner.
An oil and gas lease contract granted by the lessor and his wife
to the lessee's assignor provided that drilling operations should be
commenced within six months from the date thereof, upon the land
the subject of the lease. If not the lessee was to pay a rental of
twenty-five cents an acre per year for every additional year of the
delay, to run from the expiration of the above period, and due at
the end of each following year. Upon failure to pay the rental
before the end of each year the lease was forfeited and required no
further surrender. No part of the rentals were paid and at the end
of the first year the lease was forfeited. Some months later, how-
ever, the rentals for two years were paid to the wife of the deceased
lessor, who was at this time executor of his estate.
The question raised was, did the wife by joining the lessor in
the conveyance as a grantor become a joint obligee of sufficient de-
gree to invest her with the power to revive or reanimate the lease
that had lapsed !
Held by the court: That since the wife joined in the conveyance
only to bar her right of dower, she was invested with no right or
power that she did not possess before joining, and as she was not
capacitated at that time to execute alone a valid conveyance, she was
not by joining empowered to do an equally important thing, by re-
viving the lapsed lease contract.
This question until the above decision has been an open one in
this state, and the only authorities worthy of cognizance by the court
were a West Virginia and an Oklahoma decision cited by a member
in a very worthy dissent.
Jenkins v. Williams, et al., 191 Ky. 165. Decided March 25,
1921.
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Distinction Between an Exception and a Reservation in a Deed-
Effect of an Exception. in Excess of Interest of Grantor.
Mrs. Catherine Lilly and James F. West were joint owners of
two tracts of land. July 6, 1907, Mrs. Lilly for valuable considera-
tion conveyed to West all of her right, title and interest in and to
the two tracts of land, the said interest being an undivided one-half
interest in the two tracts. The deed contained the following clause:
"But it is distinctly understood that the first party reserves from the
aforesaid land all the minerals, coal, oils, gases and mineral waters,"
etc. West and wife conveyed to Williams and others with the same
reservation to Mrs. Lilly. This action was brought in equity by
the heirs of Mrs. Lilly against the vendees of Williams and it was
adjudged that the Lilly heirs were entitled to all the minerals in
both tracts of land. On appeal by the vendees of Williams the judg-
ment was reversed.
In construing the clause in the deed reserving the minerals to
Mrs. Lilly the court held it to be an exception instead of a reserva-
tion, the rule followed being that words in a deed purporting to
be a reservation or an exception will be construed to be either an
exception or a reservation as is evident from the whole instrument
was the intention of the parties. A reservation applies to some new
thing created for the fist time by the deed. An exception applies
to a thing in esse at time of deed and retained by grantor. The
mineral being in esse and retained by the grantor the words retaining
same were an exception and not a reservation. But Mrs. Lilly could
not except in her deed to West the latter's undivided interest in
minerals in the lands. The court cited Cyc., vol. 13, page 675, that
"An exception is void which is of a thing which the grantor does not
own, or which is of an estate or interest which has never been in
grantor." West had a one-half interest in the minerals of the two
tracts and the exception to Mrs. Lilly in excess of her own interest
was void.
Rowland, et al. v. Lilly Heirs, et al. (190 Ky. 757.)
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Counties-Indebtedness for Purposes of Improving and Con-
structing Public Highways.
On April 6, 1918, the voters of Livingston county voted a prop-
erty tax for a period of ten years at the rate of 20c on each hundred
dollars' worth of property subject to local taxation, same to be used
for the purpose of improving and constructing roads and bridges in
the county. The fiscal court entered an order levying the tax and
the sheriff collected it for the years of 1918 and 1919. This propeed-
ing in equity was begun by C. R. Eison and Mrs. Lee A. Eison and
the Commonwealth of Kentucky for the use and benefit of all the
taxpayers of Livingston county to recover from the sheriff the money
collected by virtue of the special tax. The lower court (the circuit
court of Livingston Co.) holding that under section 157a of the Con-
stitution and section 4307b, Kentucky Statutes, there must be an ex-
isting debt at the time of the levying and collecting of the special
tax, and it being admitted that Livingston county at that time was
not in debt, ordered the sheriff to turn over the money collected to
the master commissioner to be repaid to the taxpayers of the county.
The. Court of Appeals, on appeal by the sheriff, held that the
sections of the Constitution and statutes requiring an indebtedness
to be in existence before a special tax of 20c on the hundred dollars
could be levied for road purposes were complied with and that such
indebtedness is incurred within the meaning of the statute when the
fiscal court enters a proper order for work to be done on public high-
ways of the county. It further held that such sums as were col-
lected by sheriff could not be recovered from him because not used
during year collected, nor until there has been such a lapse of time
as will amount to an unreasonable delay. In the latter case a court
of equity will, upon proper application, afford relief.
Hughes v. Eison, et al. (190 Ky. 661.)

